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A FACTUAL STUDY OF BANKRUPTCY 
ADMINISTRATION AND SOME SUGGESTIONS 
Bankruptcy administration has been subject to but little fun- 
damental change in the thirty-three years since the present act was 
adopted.1 Though amendments have frequently been made,2 they 
have altered only the detail, not the general structure. But there is a 
suspicion that things have changed in respect to bankruptcy or at least 
that various assumptions basic to the system have been disproved or 
need to be qualified. Further, it is felt that the system has acquired 
or inherited from older times a rigidity that prevents it from adequately 
adjusting itself to the exigencies of the life with which it deals. 
Strange as it may seem, data illustrative of how it works or what 
it does, what kind and manner of people it touches and how it affects 
them, are not available without independent studies.3 We have estab- 
lished an institution and endowed it. We have furnished it with an in- 
tricate mechanism. We have given it high legal sanction. We have 
thrust upon it major social and economic functions. Yet we have saved 
to ourselves no method of taking its inventory, of evaluating its tech- 
nique or of appraising its method. 
Fortunately an increasing fund of data has recently been made 
available.4 While it is not exhaustive or definitive it is suggestive. On 
'The present act was adopted in 1898. See 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 24 U. S. 
C. A. ?58 (1927). 
232 STAT. 797 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. ? 11 (1927); 34 STAT. 267 (1906), 11 
U. S. C. A. ? 104 (1927); 36 STAT. 838 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. ? 11 (1927); 39 
STAT. 999 (1917), 11 U. S. C. A. ? 35 (1927); 42 STAT. 354 (1922), 11 U. S. C. A. 
? 35 (1927) ; 44 STAT. 662 (1926), 11 U. S. C. A. ?? 1, 11, 21 (1927). 
3 The only data systematically collected are contained in the Annual Reports 
of the Attorney-General. That they are hopelessly inadequate for any analysis 
of the operation of the system is evidenced by the fact that in the bankruptcy 
study being now concluded by the Department of Justice it was found necessary 
to send out to all the referees and clerks long and detailed questionnaires to 
obtain data on the operation of the system in the various districts. 
Certain it is that in any revision of the bankruptcy system special considera- 
tion should be given to this problem and machinery be designed to collect and 
make available in public records data respecting the operation of the system. 
Further consideration of this problem will be dealt with in a subsequent article. 
In this connection the annual reports of the Board of Trade in England showing 
certain "vital" statistics respecting the English bankruptcy act should be noted. 
See also Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 
329. 
4Most recent and exhaustive are the investigations in the Southern District 
of New York conducted under the direction of Hon. William J. Donovan from 
1929-1930 and the study just being concluded by the Department of Justice 
under the direction of Hon. Thomas D. Thacher, with the assistance of Mr. 
Lloyd K. Garrison. The Donovan report is reprinted in Administration of 
Bankrupt Estates (Gov. Print. Off. 1931) HOUSE COMMITTEE PRINT. 71st Cong. 3d 
Sess. The report of the Department of Justice at the time of this writing has 
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its basis an attempt will be made to evaluate certain aspects of bank- 
ruptcy. While these comments fall short of a critique of the entire 
system, they open avenues of attack to a few of the major problems 
confronting bankruptcy administration today and suggest methods for 
making that administration more effective. 
CREDITOR CONTROL 
The act is bottomed on the theory of creditor control. Provision 
is made for election of a trustee by creditors (section 44); for op- 
position to an application for a discharge (section 14); for confirma- 
tion of a composition (section 12); for meetings of creditors (section 
55); and for examination of the bankrupt (sections 21 and 55). Fur- 
ther, the interest and concern of creditors in all proceedings is assumed 
by the mandatory provision in section 58 for ten day notices to creditors 
of examinations of the bankrupt, of hearings on the confirmation of com- 
positions, of all meetings of creditors, of all proposed sales of property, 
of declaration and time of payment of dividends, of filing and examina- 
tion of final accounts of trustees, etc., and for thirty day notice of ap- 
plication for a discharge. The theory doubtless was that the creditors, 
being the most interested and concerned in the liquidation of the af- 
fairs of the debtor, would become active in the management of the 
estate and vigilant in its administration. 
But the experience of the last thirty-three years has disproved 
conclusively the desirability of such great reliance upon creditors. Their 
lethargy has become notorious. Instead of fulfilling vigilantly and en- 
ergetically the role provided for them, they have become paralyzed 
into inactivity and unconcern. And the reasons therefor are not 
difficult to divine. The predominance of absentee creditors makes it 
difficult for the creditors as a group to know intimately the affairs of 
the debtor or, even if they knew, to give to the administration a per- 
sonal and dominating influence. But perhaps more important is the 
fact that dividends on the average have been so small, and in so many 
cases non-existent, that the time and expense of an active interest and 
concern would be tantamount to throwing good money after bad. Thus 
not been made public. Some statistics collected during the course of that survey, 
however, have been made available. See Thacher, Proposed Change in Bank- 
ruptcy Act (1931) 3 N. Y. STATE BAR ASSOC. BULL. 532. 
Furthermore, the Yale Law School in 1930 made a study from the court 
records of 1004 bankruptcy cases which were closed in the District of New 
Jersey during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1929. These cases constituted all 
but 37 of the cases closed during that period. They are referred to herein as 
the New Jersey cases. Acknowledgment is made to Hon. William Clark of the 
District Court of the District of New Jersey for his assistance in making possible 
that study. For a report on other bankruptcy cases studied in New Jersey and 
Massachusetts, see Douglas, supra note 3. 
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the average return to creditors on their claims during the last, six 
years has amounted to not much over 8%.5 In this connection the data 
obtained from the 1004 New Jersey cases are of interest. In 955 of 
those cases the petition was sustained. The realized assets were only 
30% of the claims proved and allowed; and after administration costs 
were paid, dividends of less than 15%o were left for creditors. But 
this does not mean that all creditors received 15%. The total scheduled 
liabilities exceeded by almost 100% the claims actually filed, thus re- 
ducing the percentage of realization to creditors, figured on scheduled 
liabilities rather than on claims filed, to about 7%. The actual average 
dividends received by creditors who filed their claims were about 15o%. 
Many realities, however, are lost in averages. The reason credi- 
tors are fully justified in assuming that the filing of proofs of claim is 
often only a futile and expensive gesture is demonstrated clearly in a 
consideration of the cases in the small asset groups. It is reported6 
that for the nation as a whole, 82% of all cases closed during the fiscal 
year ended June 30, 1930 had either no assets or realized assets of less 
than $500. 65% had no assets whatsoever, over and above exemptions. 
When the assets were from $1 to $100 the percentage of assets con- 
sumed in administration expenses was 85%; in asset groups from 
$101 to $250, the expense was 73%; and in asset groups from $251 to 
$500, the expense was 63%. 
The data for the New Jersey cases were somewhat comparable. 
37% had no assets. 61%o had no assets or assets less than $500. Where 
realized assets were from $1 to $100, the administration expenses uni- 
formly totalled 90%; in asset groups from $101 to $250, 83%; in asset 
groups from $251 to $500, 76%. Among retailers, contractors, res- 
taurant proprietors and miscellaneous commercial groups these costs 
took all of the realized assets in over 90% of those cases where the 
assets totalled less than $100; the situation as respects laborers, clerks, 
salesmen, etc., and non-commercial groups was only slightly better 
after the $100 level was passed; while for manufacturers, creditors 
never received anything until assets amounted to more than $500. 
These data may or may not be an indictment of bankruptcy ad- 
ministration. They are not set forth as a criticism of the present pro- 
5This is for the country as a whole. See Donovan, supra note 4, at 5; and 
the annual reports of the Attorney-General. The figures of the Attorney-General 
on this point must be taken with qualifications. The scheduled liabilities are by 
no means reliable because there often is duplication of claims in different sched- 
ules by the same debtor or of the same claims by different debtors. See Gamer, 
On Comparing Friendly Adjustment and Bankruptcy (1930) 16 CORN. L. QUART. 
35, 61 et seq. The extent of the duplication has never been measured, so far as 
is known. No attempt to compute the error due to this factor was made in 
the New Jersey study. 
'See Thacher, supra note 4, at 534. 
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cedure. They are merely demonstrative of the proposition that in the 
vast majority of the cases there is no incentive for creditors to concern 
themselves with the affairs of the debtor. The expedient of wiping 
off the debt and forgetting it is not only simpler but less expensive. 
In this connection, data showing the extent of creditor participation in 
various phases of administration are of interest. 
A. Election of Trustee 
Figures collected by the Department of Justice7 for selected periods 
and districts8 show that in about 75% of the first meetings of credi- 
tors for the election of a trustee no one attended. Even in cases of com- 
mercial bankruptcy no one attended in about 50% of the meetings. In 
cases where the assets ran from $1500 to $5000 no one attended in 
about 20% of the meetings. In the cases where creditors attended these 
first meetings their representation was as follows: (1) In commercial 
bankruptcies the total attendance of creditors and proxy holders was 
less than 20% of the total number of creditors and in these meetings 
holders of proxies dominated; (2) Even in the larger cases a minority 
(in amount) of creditors controlled the elections about 66% of the time; 
and in about 40% of the meetings in such cases less than one-fourth (in 
amount) of creditors controlled the elections. These minority in- 
terests for the most part were represented by proxies.9 
Exactly comparable data were not available from the New Jersey 
cases studied. But the following seem exemplary of the same general 
situation. Out of 886 cases in which a trustee was appointed, in only 
105 did creditors directly participate, either by suggestion or election, 
in the selection of a trustee. In these 105 cases, 70 trustees were elected 
by creditors and 35 were appointed at the suggestion of creditors. The 
court records did not affirmatively show, even approximately, how many 
of these trustees were elected or suggested by proxies rather than by 
creditors personally.10 But it is interesting to note in what kinds of 
Id., at 542-543. 
8The data were obtained from two-thirds of the referees throughout the 
country for all first meetings of creditors held during the ten weeks ended 
December 15, 1930, and from other similar reports for such meetings held during 
the eight weeks ended May 15, 1931. 
8Further, it was observed that in the bulk of the cases not more than one 
or two holders of proxies were present; and that in a considerable portion of 
the cases claims were solicited, largely by attorneys, trade associations, collec- 
tion agencies, etc., and very few by creditors. A forceful indictment against the 
solicitation of proxies is presented in the Donovan report where it is said "it 
generally happens that a handful of proxies will be sufficient o control the elec- 
tion of a trustee." Donovan, supra note 4, at 13. 
10In 394 of the New Jersey cases the following data were obtained: 5306 
creditors out of 9069 (58%) executed proxies; only 101 creditors attended in 
person any meeting of creditors, including, but not restricted to, meetings for 
the examination of the bankrupt and the election of a trustee. See also Gamer, 
supra note 5, at 54 et seq. 
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cases the creditors became sufficiently interested to elect or suggest 
trustees. Of the 886 cases where a trustee was chosen there were 
778 (85%) with assets below $5000. Most of the appointments by or 
at the suggestion of the creditors took place in those cases, viz., 73 out 
of 105. But those 73 constitute only 9% of the 778. Thus in 91% 
of the cases where the assets were less than $5000 the trustee was ap- 
pointed by the court. As respects the 98 cases with assets of $5000 or 
over, different circumstances prevailed. In 32 of those cases (32%) 
the trustee was elected by the creditors or appointed at their suggestion. 
This difference between the interest and activity of creditors in cases 
of assets below $5000 on the one hand and in cases over that amount on 
the other seems substantial. And that difference does not so clearly 
appear until the $5000 group is reached. Of course, the evidence is 
by no means conclusive and at best is merely indicative of a tendency. 
The number of cases is too small to justify definitive conclusions. 
If these facts are generally representative of conditions throughout 
the country,11 it seems clear that the lethargy and lack of interest on 
the part of creditors should be recognized in formulating a bankruptcy 
procedure. It would seem desirable to provide for creditor. participa- 
tion in or control over the election of a trustee only in those cases 
where from past experience they have been shown to have an interest. 
How large the estate need be in order to elicit such interest obviously 
cannot be determined from data presently available. But there is some 
evidence, as noted above, that until the assets reach $5000 very little 
participation in the election of a trustee is present. Accordingly, it is 
tentatively suggested that in all cases having no assets or assets below 
$5000 the trustee should be appointed by the court or referee; and only 
in all other cases should creditors elect. In this detail at least, bank- 
ruptcy procedure could be made to conform more closely to the reali- 
ties of the situation with which it deals. 
B. Examinations 
Under the present act no one is under a duty to examine the 
bankrupt. The examination is left entirely to the discretion of the 
judge or referee on his own initiative or on the application of any 
officer or creditor.12 In view of the notorious lethargy of creditors and 
the absence of a mandatory provision it might be expected that con- 
siderable laxity would be shown. The following data are of interest 
in that connection. From the study made by the Department of Justice13 
1 For supporting data see Donovan, supra note 4, at 78 et seq. 
1 See ?? 21 and 55. 
13 See Thacher, supra note 4, at 538. 
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of selected groups of cases,14 it was reported that 75% (1634) were 
examined only at the first meeting of creditors, and 891 of these 1634 
were examined at the first meeting only by the referee. 10% of the 
bankrupts (212) were examined under section 21A; and 15% (325) 
were not examined at all. 
Exactly comparable data were not obtained from the New Jersey 
cases; but the following relevant information appeared. Of the 927 
cases in which information appeared in the court records, 158 (17%) 
were subject to no examination whatsoever. In 206 cases (22%) 
an examination was held under section 21A. And in 769 cases (83%) 
some examination was held, including examination at the first meeting 
of creditors as well as examinations under section 21A. An increasing 
percentage of no examinations appeared as the assets grew smaller. 
Thus, of the 403 cases with no assets or assets of less than $100, there 
were no examinations in 106 cases (34%). In the 83 cases with as- 
sets of over $5,000 there were no examinations in only 9 (11%). 
That so many bankrupts are going through the courts without any 
examination or questioning as to whence they came and whither they 
are going is a serious indictment against the system and is evidence of 
the unconcern with which one of the greatest of present social and 
economic problems is faced. 
Under the bankruptcy act of England quite different conditions 
prevail. The examination takes place automatically when a receiving 
order is made against a debtor, i.e., before the adjudication. On that 
event the debtor must submit in a prescribed form a verified statement 
of his affairs.15 The forms used for this statement are long and de- 
tailed. For traders there are 47 main questions and for non-traders 
33. The questions are designed not only to produce accurate and de- 
tailed descriptions of the nature and size of assets and liabilities but 
also to bring to light as many of the antecedents of failure as possible. 
In other words, the attempt is made through this statement to recon- 
struct the affairs of the debtor against the background of the previous 
few years. Thus the complexion of the particular failure is determined. 
The court is then under a duty to hold a public examination of the 
debtor,16 which proceeds on the basis of such statement of affairs. 
Such inquisitorial proceedings differ greatly from the practice 
14The cases numbered 3062 and the data were obtained from referees ap- 
parently for the ten week period ended December 15, 1930. 
15 See 4 & 5 GEO. V, c. 59, ? 14 (1914); BANKRUPTCY RULES (1915) No. 189. 
16See 4 & 5 GEo.V, c. 59, ? 15 (1914); BANKRUPTCY RULES (1915) Nos. 
191-194. For more detailed description of the English procedure, see Donovan, 
supra note 4, at 175 et seq. For recent summaries of the English, German, Italian, 
Mexican, Japanese, Swedish, Norwegian, Dutch, Danish, Cuban, Swiss, and Bel- 
gian bankruptcy acts, see (January, 1931) 5 JOURN. NAT. Assoc. REFEREES IN 
BANKRUPTCY 82 et seq. 
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under our act. As noted above, examination is not mandatory and the 
number of bankrupts subjected to no examination most striking. Those 
acquainted with the examination made at the first meeting of creditors 
know how perfunctory that examination tends to be. It comes at such 
an early stage of the proceedings that preparation is impossible and 
little opportunity is afforded to proceed in the light of known facts re- 
garding the affairs of the debtor. Further, even in section 21A ex- 
aminations, experience has shown that the tendency is to attempt only 
a discovery of concealed assets and a detection of fraudulent practices. 
As noted below, the discharge and criminal sections are primarily and 
almost entirely designed to catch only cases of fraud. Thus they in turn 
color and affect the whole course of the proceedings and determine its 
direction. The fact remains that the examination is shallow; its scope 
decidedly limited. And when that is coupled with the fact that so many 
bankrupts receive no examination and that an examination is not com- 
pulsory, the result is an ineffective device to uncover those facts neces- 
sary to an intelligent control of the whole course of the administration. 
The situation clearly calls for a basic revision. Reliance on credi- 
tors or officials to take the initiative should be abandoned. A positive 
duty should be placed on the bankrupt to submit to an examination 
shortly after the adjudication. The model of the English act seems 
very desirable. In other words, before the examination the bankrupt 
should be forced to submit a verified statement of his affairs, showing 
not only his assets and liabilities but also his previous experience, the 
reasons for his failure and all other facts relevant to an understanding 
of the nature of the particular bankruptcy. Not only would that furnish 
a basis for intelligent examination, but if the Bankruptcy Act were modi- 
fied as respects the discharge section in the manner hereinafter men- 
tioned, it would serve as an intelligent guide to an attempt at greater in- 
dividualized treatment of various types of bankruptcies. 
Only in some such way can bankruptcy be made less of a sanctuary 
for all insolvents. Only by some such method can any intelligent under- 
taking for more effective social control over failures be initiated. 
DISCHARGE 
Systematic and thorough examinations are not only important for 
efficient liquidation but also essential if the discharge section is to 
fulfill its prophylactic purposes. Furthermore, if the discharge sec- 
tion is to be revised so as to provide for more flexible administration and 
for greater adaptation to the various types of cases, rigorous and man- 
datory examinations become indispensable. 
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The Act provides17 that the "judge shall hear the application for 
a discharge and such proofs and pleas as may be made in opposition 
thereto by the trustees or other parties in interest, at such time as will 
give the trustee or parties in interest a reasonable opportunity to be fully 
heard; and investigate the merits of the application and discharge the 
applicant, unless he has" committed one or more of the acts specified.18 
In the absence of opposition to the discharge the application must be 
granted. Furthermore, section 14(b) provides that "the trustee shall 
not interpose objections to a bankrupt's discharge until he shall be 
authorized so to do by the creditors at a meeting called for that purpose 
on the application of any creditor." This clause and the other parts 
of the section have been construed so strictly by the courts that as a 
result creditors and only creditors can and may take the initiative in 
the matter.19 Knowing their lack of interest and activity, the number 
7? 14(b). " "(1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as herein provided; 
or (2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to keep books of ac- 
count, or records, from which his financial condition and business transactions 
might be ascertained; unless the court deem such failure or acts to have been 
justified, under all the circumstances of the case; or (3) obtained money or 
property on credit, or obtained an extension or renewal of credit, by making or 
publishing, or causing to be made or published, in any manner whatsoever, a 
materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition; or (4) at 
any time subsequent to the first day of the twelve months immediately preceding 
the filing of the petition, transferred, removed, destroyed, or concealed or per- 
mitted to be removed, destroyed, or concealed any of his property, with intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors; or (5) has been granted a discharge 
in bankruptcy within six years; or (6) in the course of proceedings in bank- 
ruptcy, refused to obey any lawful order of or to answer any material question 
approved by the court; or (7) has failed to explain satisfactorily any losses of 
assets or deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities. . . ." For an incisive treat- 
ment of the problem of discharge, see Radin, Discharge in Bankruptcy (1931) 
9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 39. 
i9 Thus it has been held that even the court has no power on its own motion 
to interpose objections to a discharge. American State Bank v. Ulrich, 28 F.(2d) 
753 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); cf. Freshman v. Atkins, 269 U. S. 121, 46 Sup. Ct. 41 
(1925). Apparently the most that the court can do is to direct that a creditors' 
meeting be called to consider whether the trustee should be authorized to file 
objections. American State Bank v. Ulrich, supra; cf. In re Whitney, 250 Fed. 
1005 (D. Mass. 1918). Even the duty of the court to "investigate the merits of 
the application" of discharge as set forth in the introductory sentence of ? 14 
has been construed to authorize the court to refuse a discharge only when it 
"acts upon matters of record" or "admitted facts." Freshman v. Atkins, 294 
Fed. 867 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923), aff'd, 269 U. S. 121, 46 Sup. Ct. 41 (1925). Fur- 
thermore, since ? 14(b) (6) was amended in 1926 to provide that such meeting 
be called "on the application of any creditor," a meeting called solely on the 
authority of the trustee will not suffice as grounds of denying a discharge. In re 
Schnoll, 44 F.(2d) 857 (S. D. N. Y. 1930); and clearly the trustee can oppose 
the discharge only when authorized by a meeting of creditors called for that 
purpose. In re Solomon, 37 F.(2d) 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). Likewise the referee 
may not authorize the trustee to oppose the discharge. In re White, 238 Fed. 
874 (N. D. Cal. 1917); In re Solomon, supra. Even where creditors have au- 
thorized the trustee to oppose a discharge, an opportunity is offered the bankrupt 
to buy them off since such authority may be revoked and the referee compelled 
to enter an order revoking such authority. In re Ruhlman, 279 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 
2d, 1922). Cf. General Order XXXII as to speed required of a creditor desirous 
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of no examinations held, and the perfunctory nature and narrow ambit 
of most examinations, it is not surprising to learn that few discharges 
are actually denied.20 
It is reported21 that of the cases filed from September 1, 1926 to 
March 1, 1929, 85,252 were granted a discharge and 776 (.9%) denied 
it; and that of the cases closed during the fiscal year ended June 30, 
1930, approximately 37,277 (non-corporate) bankrupts were granted 
a discharge and 319 (.8%) denied it. In the cases of merchants and 
manufacturers 8305 were granted a discharge and 169 (.027%) were 
denied it. In only .004% of the wage earner cases was the discharge 
denied. The discharge was granted outright in 98% of the mercantile 
bankruptcies and in 992o % of the non-mercantile bankruptcies.22 
It is also reported23 that in 8804 selected cases,24 294 meetings 
were called to authorize the trustee to oppose the bankrupt's discharge.2 
219 of these meetings were not attended by creditors in person or by 
proxy. In the balance, creditors attended, but chiefly by proxy. Thus 
the lethargy of creditors continues even where the continuing validity 
of their claims is at stake. This is made even more apparent by the 
following data. Of 49,928 cases closed in seventy-two districts in the 
fiscal year ended June 30, 1930, there were disposed of 27,426 applica- 
tions for discharge. In only 1042 of these cases did creditors file notices 
of opposing discharge in his individual capacity. 11 U. S. C. A. ? 53 (1927) 
p. 44 and cases there cited. To the effect that this order inferentially limits all 
discharge objections to creditors, see In re Walsh, 256 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 
1919). 
The language "other parties in interest" set out in ? 14(b) has in general 
been construed to include, in addition to creditors whose claims have been prop- 
erly scheduled and proved, certain others who may be adversely affected by the 
granting of a discharge. These include those who have filed a reclamation peti- 
tion which has not yet been determined [In re Perelstine, 15 F.(2d) 64 (W. D. 
Pa. 1926)], one holding a claim not dischargeable [In re Feuer, 4 F.(2d) 892 
(C. C. A. 2d, 1925); but cf. In re Chandler, 138 Fed. 637 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905)], 
one who has a provable claim but has failed to prove it [In re Ruhlman, 279 Fed. 
250 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922)], one holding a contingent or unliquidated claim not 
provable in bankruptcy [Ex parte Traphagen, Fed. Cas. No. 14,140, at 134 
(S. D. N. Y. 1842)]. No mere "volunteer" is entitled to oppose a discharge as 
a party in interest. In re White, 238 Fed. 874 (N. D. Cal. 1917) (trustee and 
referee held to be mere "volunteers"); In re Edie, 296 Fed. 245 (W. D. Pa. 
1923) (stranger to record not allowed to file objection on behalf of a creditor); 
In re Walsh, 256 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919) (referee acting as special master 
not party in interest). 
20 See also Donovan, supra note 4, at 104 et seq. 
21 See Thacher, supra note 4, at 536 et seq. 
2The foregoing figures apparently exclude from consideration cases where 
no application for discharge was made. The size of that group is not known. 
The annual reports of the Attorney-General contain no information whatsoever 
on discharges. 
23 See Thacher, supra note 4, at 538 et seq. 
Cases closed throughout the country during the ten weeks ending Decem- 
ber 15, 1930. See Thacher, supra note 4, at 538. 
25As noted above, the trustee may not oppose the application unless so au- 
thorized by the creditors. See cases cited, supra note 19. 
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of appearance stating that they intended to oppose the discharge. After 
filing such notices creditors are required to file specifications of their 
objections within 10 days.26 In only 712 of those cases did creditors 
file such written specifications. And in 108 other cases creditors filed 
objections at the time of the hearing on the application. In other 
words, in only 820 cases did creditors object to the granting of the dis- 
charge. But in 208 of those cases (25%) they withdrew their objec- 
tions, leaving only 612 to be tried on the basis of the objections. Of 
these, only 283 were denied a discharge, i.e., 1% of the total applica- 
tions. Consequently, in all but about 2% of the cases the discharges 
were granted without inquisition or inquiry and as a mere matter of 
routine. 
The conditions in the New Jersey cases were very similar. Of the 
903 cases,27 applications for discharge were made in 719. To these 
719 applications objections were made by creditors in only 48 cases 
(6.6%). These objections were made in every case solely on the ground 
of a distinctly fraudulent act on the part of the bankrupt. Only 7 of 
the 719 applications were denied (1%). These 719 cases were com- 
posed of 517 of the commercial group (retailers, manufacturers, whole- 
salers, etc.) and 201 of the non-commercial group (laborers, clerks, 
salesmen, professional men, etc.). Of the 511 commercial bankrupts, only 
6 (1%) were denied the discharge; of the 202 non-commercial bank- 
rupts, only 1 (.4%). This compares favorably with the data collected 
by the Department of Justice. 
It appeared, however, that the discharge was not requested in 184 
of the 903 cases.28 Taking those cases into consideration the discharge 
was granted then only in 712 of 903 cases (79%). Some interesting 
data were obtained on the nature of the cases where discharge was not 
requested. In 89 of the 184 cases (42%), the bankrupt was a corpo- 
ration and hence might not need a discharge. Since normally the de- 
funct corporation would have to be rehabilitated completely, it might 
be just as simple and even more advisable to dissolve it and form a 
new one. In the 95 cases where an individual person failed to apply 
for a discharge it was known that some had absconded, some died, some 
were negligent and some feared creditors. But data sufficient to enable 
an accurate classification of these cases were not obtained. It would be 
difficult to say that had application been made in each of these 184 cases, 
the discharge would have been granted in 99%-as was true of the 
2General Order, XXXII, supra note 19. 
27Excluding 28 cases of insufficient data, 24 cases of compositions and 49 
cases of petitions dismissed. 
8 The number of cases studied by the Department of Justice in which there was no application for a discharge has not been reported at the date of this 
writing. 
34 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.21 on Thu, 13 Jun 2013 16:21:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION 
719 which did apply. It may be that many or most of these 184 with- 
held application because of the existence of fraud and the opposition 
of creditors. Even so, the percentage of discharges remains exceed- 
ingly high and the percentage of cases where creditors objected strik- 
ingly low. 
In the 7 cases where the discharge was denied the grounds were 
concealing or removing assets or falsification of books. The acts com- 
plained of were distinctly fraudulent in nature. No case was found 
where an objection was made or discharge denied for failure to keep 
books. 
The contrast of the English system is striking. The procedure for 
dispensing discharges is fundamentally different. An inquiry into the 
affairs of the debtor to ascertain if he is entitled to a discharge is not 
left to the whim or initiative of creditors. It is provided29 that the ap- 
plication for a discharge shall not be heard "until the public examination 
of the bankrupt is concluded," and that on the hearing 
"the Court shall take into consideration a report of the 0. R. as to the 
bankrupt's conduct and affairs (including a report as to the bankrupt's con- 
duct during the proceedings under his bankruptcy), and may either grant 
or refuse an absolute order of discharge, or suspend the operation of the 
order for a specified time, or grant an order of discharge subject to any 
conditions with respect to any earnings or income which may afterwards 
become due to the bankrupt, or with respect to his after-acquired property: 
"Provided that where the bankrupt has committed any misdemeanour 
under this Act, or any enactment repealed by this Act, or any other mis- 
demeanour connected with his bankruptcy, or any felony connected with 
his bankruptcy, or where in any case any of the facts hereinafter men- 
tioned are proved, the Court shall either . . ; and 
"(i) refuse the discharge; or 
"(ii) suspend the discharge for such period as the Court thinks proper; 
or 
"(iii) suspend the discharge until a dividend of not less than ten shil- 
lings in the pound has been paid to the creditors; or 
"(iv) require the bankrupt as a condition of his discharge to consent 
to judgment being entered against him by the 0. R. or trustee 
for any balanc;e or part of any balance of the debts provable 
under the bankruptcy which is not satisfied at the date of the 
discharge, such balance or part of any balance of the debts to 
be paid out of the future earnings or after-acquired property of 
the bankrupt in such manner and subject to such conditions as 
the Court may direct; but execution shall not be issued on the 
judgment without leave of the Court, which leave may be given 
on proof that the bankrupt has since his discharge acquired prop- 
erty or income available towards payment of his debts: 
"Provided that, if at any time after the expiration of two years from 
the date of any order made under this section the bankrupt satisfies the 
24 & 5 GEo. V, c. 59, ? 26 (1914), as amended by 16 & 17 GEO. V, c. 7 (1926). 
See Donovan, supra note 4, at 104-105, 182-183. 
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Court that there is no reasonable probability of his being in a position to 
comply with the terms of such order, the Court may modify the terms of 
the order, or of any substituted order, in such manner and upon such con- 
ditions as it may think fit."30 
Two distinctive features of this act are to be noted: (1) A system- 
atic hearing on the application, based upon the facts elicited from the 
previous examinations of the bankrupt and his conduct during bank- 
ruptcy. Reliance is not placed on creditors to furnish the initiative. As 
a result no discharge is granted without a hearing. (2) A greater ad- 
ministrative flexibility in dispensing discharges. The court is not re- 
stricted to the rather limited alternatives existing under our act of either 
granting or denying the discharge. All degrees of in-between cases are 
recognized by providing for suspension or conditional grant of dis- 
charges. Thus there is greater adaptation of the penalty to the require- 
ments of the various types of cases. In that connection the following 
data compiled from the annual reports of the Board of Trade for the 
30 The facts referred to are: 
"(a) That the bankrupt's assets are not of a value equal to ten shillings in 
the pound on the amount of his unsecured liabilities, unless he satisfies the 
Court that the fact that the assets are not of a value equal to ten shillings in the 
pound on the amount of his unsecured liabilities has arisen from circumstances 
for which he cannot justly be held responsible: 
"(b) That the bankrupt has omitted to keep such books of account as are 
usual and proper in the business carried on by him and as sufficiently disclose 
his business transactions and financial position within the three years immedi- 
ately preceding his bankruptcy: 
"(c) That the bankrupt has continued to trade after knowing himself to be 
insolvent: 
"(d) That the bankrupt has contracted any debt provable in the bankruptcy 
without having at the time of contracting it any reasonable or probable ground 
of expectation (proof whereof shall lie on him) of being able to pay it: 
"(e) That the bankrupt has failed to account satisfactorily for any loss of 
assets or for any deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities: 
"(f) That the bankrupt has brought on, or contributed to, his bankruptcy 
by rash and hazardous speculations, or by unjustifiable extravagance in living, 
or by gambling, or by culpable neglect of his business affairs: 
"(g) That the bankrupt has put any of his creditors to unnecessary expense 
by a frivolous or vexatious defence to any action properly brought against him: 
"(h) [That the bankrupt has brought on or contributed to his bankruptcy 
by incurring unjustifiable expense in bringing any frivolous or vexatious action]: 
"(i) That the bankrupt has, within three months preceding the date of the 
receiving order, when unable to pay his debts as they become due, given an un- 
due preference to any of his creditors: 
"(j) That the bankrupt has, within three months preceding the date of the 
receiving order, incurred liabilities with a view of making his assets equal to ten 
shillings in the pound on the amount of his unsecured liabilities: 
"(k) That the bankrupt has, on any previous occasion, been adjudged bank- 
rupt, or made a composition or arrangement with his creditors: 
"(1) That the bankrupt has been guilty of any fraud or fraudulent breach 
of trust." 
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years 1924-1929 inclusive are of interest. During that period 5520 
discharges were disposed of finally. The dispositions were: 
Granted Refused Conditional Suspended 
140 (2.7%) 157 (2.8%) 1268 (22.9%) 3955 (71.6%) 
Specifications of the conditions imposed in the 1268 cases are not 
available. But as to the 3013 cases for the years 1926-1929 inclusive, 
where the discharge was suspended, the following were the periods of 
suspension and the number of cases in each period: 
1 day or less ........................................... 120 
Over 1 day but less than 1 month ...................... 183 
Over 1 month but less than 1 year...................... 1313 
Over 1 year but less than 2 years ........................ 470 
Over 2 years but less than 3 years ....................... 620 
Over 3 years ......................................... 307 
It would be difficult and unfair to attempt a comparison of the 
disposition of applications for discharge in this country with that in 
England. As seen from the discharge sections set forth above, the 
grounds for denying the discharge under our act differ greatly from 
those specified in the English act for suspending it or granting it con- 
ditionally or unconditionally. However, a striking difference in the 
method of approach to the problem is apparent. Instead of a rather 
rigid procedure there is an extremely flexible one, susceptible to greater 
individualized treatment of cases. It is a recognition of the folly of at- 
tempting to force all cases into one of two molds, of classifying all 
bankrupts in the manner of the exclusive duality of our section 14. 
Elsewhere there has been presented the need for greater discrimi- 
nation between the many types of bankrupts and for a determination of 
the functions of bankruptcy in light of the realities of the cases that 
constitute the grist of the mill.31 That phase of the problem will not 
be repeated here. Suffice it to say at this point that whether or not 
the grounds for objecting to the discharge are increased or modified, 
the following revisions should be made: 
1. A compulsory and systematic hearing on every application for a 
discharge; and 
2. A discretion on the part of the court or other official in charge to 
refuse, suspend, or grant, unconditionally or conditionally, the discharge 
in light of the facts and complexions of the individual cases.32 
31 See Douglas, supra note 3. 
32No tightening of the discharge section should ignore the situation as re- 
spects the corporation. It is not known how many bankrupts each year are 
corporations. Of the 1004 New Jersey cases studied, 95 (9.5%) were corpora- 
tions. And as noted above, 89 of these 95 corporations did not even apply for 
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CRIMINAL PROVISIONS 
Very little is known respecting the operation of the criminal provi- 
sions of the Bankruptcy Act.33 The Annual Reports of the Attorney- 
a discharge. Insulation from liability can be so easily and inexpensively ob- 
tained under modern statutes that there might follow from a tightening up of 
discharge a tendency to incorporate before entering business. If this were 
done the tightening up process would not necessarily be effective as no applica- 
tion for discharge need be made. The problem of effective control over the 
phenomena of failures-business or otherwise-has so many ramifications that 
it becomes as extensive and varied as the life which bankruptcy touches or 
affects. For other aspects of this problem, see Douglas, supra note 3. 
3? 29 provides: "Offenses.-A person shall be punished, by imprisonment 
for a period not to exceed five years, upon conviction of the offense of having 
knowingly and fraudulently appropriated to his own use, embezzled, spent, or 
unlawfully transferred any property or secreted or destroyed any document 
belonging to a bankrupt estate which came into his charge as trustee, receiver, 
custodian, or other officer of the court. 
"A person shall be punished, by imprisonment for a period not to exceed 
five years, upon conviction of the offense of having knowingly and fraudulently 
(1) concealed from the receiver, trustee, United States marshal, or other officer 
of the court charged with the control or custody of property, or from creditors 
in composition cases, any of the property belonging to the estate of a bankrupt; 
or (2) made a false oath or account in, or in relation to any proceeding in 
bankruptcy; (3) presented under oath any false claim for proof against the 
estate of a bankrupt, or used any such claim in composition, personally or by 
agent, proxy, or attorney, or as agent, proxy, or attorney; or (4) received any 
material amount of property from a bankrupt after the filing of the petition, 
with intent to defeat this Act; or (5) received or attempted to obtain any money 
or property, remuneration, compensation, reward, advantage, or promise thereof 
from any person for acting or forbearing to act in bankruptcy proceedings; or 
(6) having been an officer or agent of any person or corporation, and in con- 
templation of the bankruptcy of such person or corporation, or with intent to 
defeat the operation of this Act, concealed or transferred any of the property 
of the debtor; or (7) after the filing of the petition, or, in contemplation of 
bankruptcy, concealed, destroyed, mutilated, or falsified any book, document, or 
record affecting or relating to the property or affairs of a bankrupt; or (8) 
after the filing of the petition, withheld from the receiver or trustee any book, 
document, or paper affecting or relating to the property or affairs of a bank- 
rupt, to the possession of which he is entitled. 
"A person shall be punished by fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars, and 
forfeit his office, and the same shall thereupon become vacant, upon conviction 
of the offense of having knowingly (1) acted as a referee in a case in which he 
is directly or indirectly interested; or (2) purchased, while a referee, directly 
or indirectly, any property of the estate in bankruptcy of which he is referee; or 
(3) refused, while a referee or trustee, to permit a reasonable opportunity for 
the inspection of the accounts relating to the affairs of, and the papers and 
records of, estates in his charge by parties in interest when directed by the court 
so to do. 
"A person shall not be prosecuted for any offense arising under this Act un- 
less the indictment is found or the information is filed in court within three 
years after the commission of the offense. 
"(1) Whenever any referee, receiver, or trustee shall have grounds for be- 
lieving that any offense under this Act has been committed, or from facts or 
circumstances brought out in the course of administration or otherwise brought 
to his attention, that there is reasonable ground to believe that such an offense 
has been committed, or for special reason, an investigation should be had in 
connection therewith, it shall be the duty of such referee, receiver, or trustee 
to report such matter to the United States attorney for the district in which it 
is believed such an offense has been committed, including in such report a state- 
ment of all the facts and circumstances of the case within his knowledge, with 
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General merely show with customary succinctness and generality the 
total convictions, acquittals, nolles, etc., without any specification of the 
offenses prosecuted, sentences imposed, etc. 
But through the courtesy of the Committee for the Study of the 
Business of the Federal Courts,34 appointed by the National Commission 
on Law Observance and Enforcement, data for the first time have been 
made available respecting the operation of the criminal provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Act. The study conducted by that Committee was made 
in thirteen federal districts35 in twelve states. All of the criminal cases, 
including the bankruptcy cases concluded during the three fiscal years 
ended June 30, 1930, were taken. The data were obtained solely from 
the court records.36 
the names of the witnesses, and a statement as to the offense or offenses believed 
to have been committed. 
"(2) It shall be the duty of every United States attorney immediately to 
inquire into the fact so reported to him by any referee, receiver, or trustee, and 
the law applicable thereto, and if it appears probable that any offense under this 
Act has been committed, in a proper case and without delay, to present the matter 
to the grand jury, unless upon inquiry and examination such district attorney de- 
cides that the ends of public justice do not require that the alleged offense should 
be investigated or prosecuted, in which case he shall report the facts to the At- 
torney-General for his direction in the premises." See also ? 41. 
For a statement of the abuses disclosed in New York, see Donovan, supra 
note 4, at 40 et seq., 104 et seq. 
34 Composed of Dean Charles E. Clark, Chairman, Professor T. W. Arnold, 
Dean Henry M. Bates, Pres. Robert M. Hutchins, Dean Orrin K. McMurray, 
Professor Harold R. Medina, Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Hon. Owen J. 
Roberts, and Professor William O. Douglas, Sec. The conclusions respecting 
these data are not set forth as representing the views of the committee but only 
those of the writers of this article. The report of the Committee covering these 
bankruptcy cases has not yet been made. 
35 Northern District of California, District of Colorado, District of Connecti- 
cut, Northern District of Illinois, District of Kansas, Eastern District of Loui- 
siana, District of Massachusetts, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern District 
of New York, Western District of North Carolina, Northern District of Ohio, 
Southern District of Ohio and the Southern District of West Virginia. 
The studies in those respective districts were conducted under the super- 
vision of Dean Orrin K. McMurray of the School of Jurisprudence, University 
of California, former Dean James G. Rogers and Dean Robert L. Stearns of the 
University of Colorado Law School, Dean Charles E. Clark and Prof. Wm. O. 
Douglas of the Yale Law School, Dean Henry A. Bigelow and Prof. E. W. 
Puttkammer of the University of Chicago Law School, Prof. T. E. Atkinson of 
the University of Kansas Law School, Dean Rufus C. Harris of Tulane Univer- 
sity Law School, Prof. E. M. Morgan of Harvard Law School, Dean Henry M. 
Bates of University of Michigan Law School, Prof. Harold R. Medina of Colum- 
bia Law School, Dean Charles T. McCormick of University of North Carolina 
Law School, Dean Herschel W. Arant and Prof. Silas A. Harris of Ohio State 
University Law School, and Dean T. W. Arnold and Prof. J. B. Fordham of the 
University of West Virginia Law School. 
36 For further description of the method and scope of the study, see PROGRESS 
REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Report No. 
7 of the National Commission on Law Observance & Enforcement, 1931). It 
should be noted that the unit taken for the study was the individual rather than 
the indictment or information. Thus if tzvo persons were covered by one in- 
dictment, it would be treated as two cases. 
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Table I shows the nature of the offense prosecuted and the result of 
the prosecution. 
TABLE I 
OFFENSES AND DISPOSITIONS 
Discharged; Information Convicted 
Directed Ver- or Indict- Convicted Othert Other 
No. of diet or After ment Dis- Nolle Guilty (Plea of Dispo- 
Offenses Cases Jury Trial missed Prosequi Plea* Not Guilty) sitionS 
1. Concealing 
assetslf 491 35 37 143 199 67 10 
2. False state- 
ment of 
assets 5 2 3 
3. Perjury 8 1 6 1 
4. Receiving 
bankrupt's 
property 2 2 
5. Contempt 2 1 1 
6. Making 
false claim 2 1 1 
7. Conspiracy to 
violate act 22 2 1 15 2 2 
8. Conversion 
by trustee 1 1 
9. Conversion 
by receiver 4 4 
Total 537 39 38 161 218 69 12 
*Includes plea of guilty to part. 
t Includes conviction on only some counts. 
t Includes mistrials and removals. 
f Includes conspiracy to conceal and concealing of assets combined with per- 
jury, mutilating books, falsifying records, fraudulent conveyances, conspiracy, 
perjury. 
It will be seen that of the total of 537 cases, 491 (91%) involved 
concealment of assets, conspiracy to conceal, or concealment combined 
with other offenses such as perjury, mutilation, falsification or with- 
holding of books and records, or fraudulent transfers. A further 
analysis of the total reveals that 446 of the 491 involved concealment or 
conspiracy alone and not in combination with other types of offenses. 
Practically all of the other 45 cases in the group of 491 combined with 
concealment the offenses of falsification, mutilation, etc., of books and 
records. The vast majority of the cases then are being brought under 
section 29 (1), the number of all other cases being relatively insignifi- 
cant in terms of the total. 
The number discharged, dismissed and nolled were 238 or 44% 
of the total number of prosecutions. This is a surprisingly high mor- 
tality. The nolles alone constituted 29% of the total. Whatever the 
conditions which are responsible for this showing, whether inefficient 
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prosecution or difficulty of proof of the particular types of offenses to 
which bankruptcy under the present type of administration is suscepti- 
ble, they call for a searching reexamination of the whole procedure. 
It is interesting to note that in 40% of the cases (218 out of 537), 
there were convictions on guilty pleas. The use of guilty pleas has been 
noted elsewhere.37 That in 218 of the 287 convictions (75%) the plea 
of guilty appeared is not necessarily a condemnation of the procedure. 
But it is indicative of the major role of the prosecutor in these bank- 
ruptcy cases and of the extent of the discretion being employed in that 
office. Thus it furnishes one focal point for any further effort towards 
fortifying the present laws and securing more rigorous enforcement. 
In this connection it should be noted that a jury trial was had in only 
11 of the 287 convictions (3.8%), again pointing to the office of the 
prosecutor as the key point in the further study and analysis of the prob- 
lem of law enforcement in bankruptcy. 
Parenthetically it might be added that of the 69 cases of conviction 
on pleas of not guilty there were appeals in 16 (23%) of the cases. In 
four of these there was error. 
Table II shows the nature of the sentences imposed. 
TABLE II 
SENTENCES 
Guilty Pleas Not Guilty Pleas Total 
Suspended sentence 30 6 36 
Probation 8 3 11 
Suspended sentence and probation 56 8 64 
Sentence-Term: 
0- 2 months 26 1 27 
3- 6 months 35 7 42 
7-12 months 33 10 43 
13-24 months 20 20 40 
Over 24 months 0 8 8 
Fine 36 12 48 
Total 244* 75t 319 
* Includes 26 duplications, most of which were combinations of fine and sus- 
pended sentence. 
t Includes six duplications composed of either fine and imprisonment or im- 
prisonment with suspended sentence and probation. 
It will be noted how the percentage of the lighter sentences of 
probation and suspended sentence increases in the case of guilty pleas 
and how the percentage of imprisonment and fines increases in the case 
of pleas of not guilty. Likewise, where there is imprisonment, the in- 
crease in the percentage of terms over 12 months is more marked in 
37 See e.g., PROGRESS REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, supra note 36, at 22 et seq. 
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cases of pleas of not guilty. Doubtless these reflect the element of bar- 
gaining present when guilty pleas are accepted. 
The relative insignificance of the fine, the presence of such large 
numbers of suspended sentences and probations, and such large numbers 
of imprisonments for short periods indicate the lack of severity in the 
enforcement of the criminal penalties of the statute. The chances of 
severity of treatment become quite remote in face of this array of data, 
for if one survives the discharge, dismissal and nolle stage, he may yet 
bargain for relatively light sentences and secure them. 
The picture thus given of bankruptcy prosecution does not purport 
to be complete and definitive and obviously cannot be taken as con- 
demnatory of the whole system. But it does present elements of laxity 
and inefficiency consistent with other aspects of bankruptcy administra- 
tion considered above. To consider the criminal provisions separate and 
apart from the whole problem of the administration of bankrupt es- 
tates would be foolish. All parts are intimately related. So long as the ad- 
ministration is not vigilant, so long as creditors are relied upon to take 
responsibilities which they shirk, so long as debtors may proceed blithely 
through bankruptcy without being interrogated or bothered by officials, 
so long as the public concern over or interest in the types of persons 
receiving discharges remains at its present low ebb, the general picture 
of the criminal aspects of bankruptcy may be expected to remain much 
the same. Only after making the basic and fundamental changes enu- 
merated above can any material and permanent improvement be made 
which will be reflected in more vigilant detection and prosecution of 
offenses. To start with an attempt to improve the criminal provisions 
and machinery would be to start at the wrong end of the problem. 
ASSIGNMENTS, EXTENSIONS, AND COMPOSITIONS 
Under section 3 (5) of the Bankruptcy Act, "any general assign- 
ment for the benefit of creditors" constitutes an "act of bankruptcy." 
In other words, if a debtor desires to work out an "extension" with his 
creditors or to proceed to liquidate his assets with their cooperation or 
under their direction and does not secure practically 100% consent of 
creditors, dissatisfied creditors or creditors made more disgruntled by 
fee chasing lawyers may petition the case into bankruptcy.38 Or unless 
38Under ? 4(b) of the bankruptcy act a person owing debts of $1000 or 
over may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. Of course, where the alleged 
act of bankruptcy is the assignment, those creditors assenting in the assignment 
cannot later petition the debtor into involuntary bankruptcy. In re Houstman, 
7 F.(2d) 329 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). But just what constitutes "consent" is doubt- 
ful. Thus it has been held that consent to the assignment with respect to a par- 
ticular debt does not bar a petition for bankruptcy at the instigation of the same 
creditor if grounded upon a different claim. Hays v. Wagner, 150 Fed. 533 (C. 
C. A. 6th, 1907). And consent to an assignment which proves invalid is not 
consent to a subsequent assignment in which the technical shortcomings of the 
first assignment were cured. Doty v. Mason, 244 Fed. 587 (S. D. Fla. 1917) 
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100% consent has been obtained, one dissatisfied creditor may by threats 
create a high nuisance value or perhaps even proceed to enforce his 
claims without reference to the cooperative arrangements of the debtor 
and other creditors. 
National statistics showing the extent of these cooperative forms 
of liquidation and operation of financially embarrassed businesses are 
not available. But of recent years they have been the subject of an in- 
creasing number of studies, and their virtues and disadvantages re- 
viewed and discussed.39 
A resumne of all of those devices, their nature and operation, will not 
be attempted at this point. But there is chosen as perhaps generally 
illustrative of the character of the problem dealt with and the method 
employed, the so-called "friendly adjustment" sponsored by the Na- 
tional Association of Credit Men.40 In the analysis which follows an 
attempt will be made to ascertain whether the competitive relation be- 
tween bankruptcy and these voluntary forms of procedure can be re- 
moved or reduced and their respective operations effectively integrated 
and coordinated. 
The system of friendly adjustment takes the form of an assign- 
ment by the debtor of all his property to a trustee for the benefit of 
creditors. This trustee is generally the local branch manager of the 
credit association and the assignment takes place at the instigation of 
either the creditors or the debtor. The purpose of such assignment may 
be either to work out an "extension" whereby the business will be con- 
tinued, or to effect a liquidation of the assets of the debtor. After the 
local credit manager has had an opportunity to talk with the debtor and 
ascertain his condition, he generally attempts to bring together all the 
creditors for the purpose of considering an assignment. This first meet- 
39 For a review of the use of creditors' committees in effecting reorganiza- 
tions during the inventory deflation of 1920-1921 and a discussion of their ad- 
vantages and disadvantages (both legal and business), see DEWING, FINANCIAL 
POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 1133-1162. For a collection of cases and other 
materials bearing upon legal aspects of reorganization through creditors' com- 
mittees, see DOUGLAS AND SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE RE- 
ORGANIZATION (1931) 502-519. 
Recent discussions of the type of settlement or adjustment popularly called 
"friendly adjustment" are to be found in Billig, What Price Bankruptcy: A Plea 
for "Friendly Adjustment" (1929) 14 CORN. L. QUART. 413; Billig, Extra-Judi- 
cial Administration of Insolvent Estates: A Study of Recent Cases (1930) 78 
U. OF PA. L. REV. 293; Gamer, supra note 5. Cf. Michael, Problems of a Common 
Law Assignee (Dec. 1925) CREDIT CRAFT 32; Incompetent Common Law Trus- 
tees (Oct. 1927) N. Y. CREDIT MEN'S Assoc. BULL. 
'4 For the list of "approved" adjustment bureaus organized and operated by 
the National Association of Credit Men during the last twenty-five years and 
presently (i.e., in 1930) existing, see Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of 
Insolvent Estates, etc., supra note 39, at 295. These "friendly adjustments" are 
not represented as being necessarily typical of the run of assignments but are 
set forth as representing perhaps the most highly developed and efficient type 
of which there is a record. 
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ing of creditors generally decides first whether the failure of the debtor 
to meet his obligations is so tainted with "fraud" or "dishonesty" as to 
make "friendly adjustment" inadvisable. If, however, such an adjust- 
ment is agreed upon, this meeting of creditors decides whether an "ex- 
tension" or "liquidation" is advisable.41 It is essential, as noted above, 
that practically all of the creditors consent to the assignment lest the 
entire scheme be disrupted by non-consenting creditors who may seize 
upon the assignment as an "act of bankruptcy." 
Following the assignment, the business is either continued-gen- 
erally with the debtor in charge but supervised by the trustee-or 
is wound up by the credit bureau which either assumes complete 
direction or proceeds under the direction of a creditors' committee. 
If the creditors give the bureau free rein to attend to the whole matter 
of extension or liquidation, they take as little part in the process as they 
do in bankruptcy; they are merely notified as to what occurs or is pro- 
posed. Customarily the credit bureau charges a flat 10% of monies 
collected as its fee, but this does not necessarily constitute the entire 
administrative expense.42 
One of the advantages urged for this method of adjustment is that 
it results in stimulating active creditor participation, which as already 
indicated, is lacking in the case of bankruptcy administration.43 This 
conclusion is tentatively borne out by a random sample of friendly ad- 
justment cases which were in the process of settlement in Newark, New 
Jersey, during the time the New Jersey bankruptcy cases were being 
studied.44 In slightly less than half of these cases, creditors' committees 
were appointed and apparently took an active part in supervising the 
sale of assets and devising ways and means of liquidating stock or fix- 
tures. These creditors' committees also supervised the operation of the 
business during an extension period. Even where a creditors' commit- 
tee was not appointed, at least half the creditors attended from one to 
four general creditors' meetings. 
Simplified procedure is the dominant characteristic of the liquida- 
tion process under the friendly adjustment plan. This is claimed as 
another of the great advantages of such assignments. Disposals of as- 
sets are made in bulk at private sale, notices to creditors are for the 
41 See Billig, What Price Bankruptcy, etc., supra note 39, at 428 et seq. 
42 Id., at 432 et seq.; Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Es- 
tates, etc., supra note 39, at 303 et seq. 3 See Billig, What Price Bankruptcy, etc., supra note 39, at 422 et seq., 438 
et seq. 
4 There were 30 such cases which were obtained from the current files of the 
Newark, N. J., adjustment bureau during the spring of 1930. Acknowledgment 
is made to Dr. W. C. Plummer of the Department of Commerce for his assist- 
ance in this connection, and to the officials in charge for their many courtesies 
and assistance. 
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most part dispensed with and the trustee given a generally free hand 
to liquidate as quickly as possible. It is insisted that the credit associa- 
tion applies a professional technique to the business of liquidation. 
With its staff of full-time employees and wide trade contacts, it is said 
to be able to do a far more efficient job than can a bankruptcy court 
which has to set up a new liquidating agency (receiver and trustee who 
are too often not skilled in the particular type of business at hand) to 
handle each insolvent estate.45 
It has been argued, however, that the advantages of friendly ad- 
justment over bankruptcy are to a considerable degree illusory-that 
assumed efficiency reflected in apparently higher percentages of divi- 
dends paid arises largely because the cases are highly selected, while 
bankruptcy must take all comers; that oversimplified procedure results 
in injustices and preferences that would have no standing at law; that 
laymen and credit bureaus are hardly competent to pass on matters of 
"fraud" or "dishonesty"; that the success of friendly adjustment is due 
not to the system but to excellence of personnel, which excellence is 
similarly possible under the bankruptcy system.46 
The various arguments pro and con, however, are beyond the point 
of this article. It seems clear that many extensions and liquidation 
assignments are being successfully carried on and that they have many 
advantages over the administration of debtors' estates by bankruptcy 
courts. So long as such assignments operate successfully, so long as 
friendly adjustment reveals a fairly active creditor participation and ap- 
parently an efficient administration, it is difficult to see why it should 
not be utilized and given legal sanction in the Bankruptcy Act. Were 
section 3 of the Bankruptcy Act so modified as to provide that an assign- 
ment for the benefit of creditors should not constitute an act of bank- 
ruptcy where the terms of such assignment are approved by a certain 
majority of creditors in number and amount and filed with a referee 
in bankruptcy, much would be done to remove the nuisance value of one 
or two creditors who refuse to join in the assignment and either force 
immediate payment in full or sit by and wait until the majority have 
taken the risks of granting an extension, and when the business is go- 
ing again, press for payment in full.46a The injustice of a system which 
5 See Billig, Extra-Judicial Administration of Insolvent Estates, etc., supra 
note 39, at 297 et seq. 
46 See Gamer, supra note 5, at 37 et seq. a 
Although an assignment for the benefit of creditors brings the assigned 
property into custodia legis so as to avoid attachment or garnishment in the 
hands of the assignee [Reddy v. Raymond, 194 Mass. 367, 80 N. E. 484 (1907)], 
nevertheless non-assenting creditors may levy upon property in the hands of the 
trustee if the assignment is "in fraud of or to hinder and delay creditors." Cf. 
Reid v. McIntyre, 98 U. S. 507 (1878). Furthermore, in states holding the mere 
acceptance of the assignment by the assignee to be insufficient consideration to 
45 
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permits such practices is illustrated by the Newark friendly adjustment 
cases discussed above, in which in about one-third of the cases, one or 
more minority creditors contrived to get themselves paid in full as a 
result of their power to break up the whole adjustment program if they 
were not bought off. 
Of course any modification of section 3 along the lines suggested 
should empower the referee to refuse to file the assignment if the plan 
submitted shows evidence of majority oppression or the court is not 
satisfied as to the integrity or efficiency of the assignee. A further ad- 
vantage in according legal sanction to assignments to effectuate exten- 
sions or liquidation lies in providing a control over these non-judicial 
settlements effective to check fraudulent or repeated failures. In the 
Newark adjustment cases, the credit bureau and the first meeting of 
creditors generally considered the question of whether the failure was 
"fraudulent" or "dishonest." But naturally both the credit bureau 
and the creditors were more interested in the possibility of a substantial 
return than in impartial inquiry into the nature of the failure. One is 
impressed with the fact that the inquiry of creditors was not for the pur- 
pose of deciding the nature of the debtor's past conduct; it was di- 
rected only along the line of deciding whether the debtor would now 
"cooperate" in a proposed assignment. Accordingly, it seems advisable to 
include in the foregoing suggested modification of the Bankruptcy Act, 
a power in the referee to refuse to file an assignment if the causes of 
the debtor's failure embrace any of those set out in section 14, dealing 
with grounds for refusing a discharge. This, in effect, is nothing more 
support the assignment, non-participating creditors may levy upon the assigned 
property. Faulkner v. Hyman, 142 Mass. 53, 6 N. E. 846 (1886). And if for 
any reason the assignment is "void" or "voidable" as where the requirements of 
the statute on assignment have not been strictly complied with, non-assenting 
creditors may garnish property in the hands of the assignee. McCord-Norton 
Shoe Co. v. Brown, 131 Kan. 19, 289 Pac. 417 (1930) (a single non-assenting 
creditor allowed to garnish property assigned to branch of National Credit Asso- 
ciation where assignment technically defective); Doughty v. Weston, 174 App. 
Div. 212, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1075 (lst Dept. 1916) (assignment to creditors' com- 
mittee conditioned on unanimous acceptance ineffective to prevent garnishment 
by non-consenting creditors). But cf. Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Goodrich & 
Martineau Co., 189 Wis. 406, 207 N. W. 954 (1926) (statute provided against 
contingency occurring in McCord-Norton case, supra). In any case, a creditor 
may prosecute his claim to judgment against the assignor [Central Trust Co. of 
Mobile v. Edward D'Arcy, 238 Mo. 676, 142 S. W. 294 (1911)] which will allow 
him to recover in full from the assignor if creditors participating in an assign- 
ment have released the assignor by sharing pro rata. Such judgment will also 
permit subsequent attachment of any surplus in the hands of the assignee after 
participating creditors have been paid [State National Bank v. Wheeler and 
Mather Mercantile Co., 104 Ark. 222, 148 S. W. 1033 (1912)] as well as the levy 
of process upon any property not assigned or assignable by the instrument. Cf. 
Rainwater-Bradford Hat Co. v. McBride, 117 Fed. 597 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902). 
Cases such as these illustrate the strength of the dissenter's legal position and the 
means that may be employed to secure more than a pro rata share of all the 
debtor's assets. 
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than according the court the power to deny a discharge in these non- 
judicial settlements. Indeed it might be advisable to go even further and 
provide that, as is now the law with respect to discharge, no second as- 
signment for the benefit of creditors may be filed within a certain 
period.47 
Improved efficiency of friendly adjustment proceedings would be 
further stimulated if section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act were modified so 
as to include within its definition of "trustee" an assignee-trustee and 
thus give to such assignee-trustee the same powers now possessed by a 
trustee in bankruptcy. Among the main results which should flow from 
such a modification are the allowance to such an assignee-trustee of 
the right to examine witnesses before the referee, the investing of the 
assignee with the same title to the property of the debtor and the same 
power to avoid preferences and frauduent transfers as are now granted 
a trustee in bankruptcy, and a similar power of objecting to the claims 
of certain creditors by causing them to be determined judicially. Of 
course, such broad powers should be accompanied by the imposition of 
duties on an assignee-trustee similar to those to which a trustee in bank- 
ruptcy is subject. Thus the court or referee should be empowered to 
supervise the fee charged and to declare void unlawful preferences made 
by such an assignee-trustee in favor of a particular friendly group of 
creditors. 
The recent case of Garrison v. Pilliod Cabinet Co.47a illustrates the 
need of judicial recognition of friendly adjustment settlements. In this 
case, a branch of the National Association of Credit Men, to which an 
assignment for the benefit of creditors had been made, was subsequently 
presumed disqualified to act as a trustee in bankruptcy because of the in- 
consistency of its position in representing all creditors impartially. Such 
a holding would be unnecessary if judicial approval and surveillance of 
the assignee were had from the start. 
The debtor, too, should be protected by a provision permitting him 
to secure a discharge if he has complied and cooperated with the friendly 
47The problem raised by this suggested provision is illustrated by a series 
of recent cases dealing with discharge and compositions. Under ? 14(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Act a confirmed composition gives the debtor his discharge. In re 
Abrams & Rubins, 173 Fed. 430 (S. D. N. Y. 1909). And a discharge by com- 
position has been held to preclude a discharge in bankruptcy within six years of 
the discharge by composition under ? 14(b)(5). In re Massell, 285 Fed. 577 
(D. Mass. 1922). It has been but recently decided that the confirmation of 
a first composition within six years of the application for confirmation of a 
second composition is not a valid ground for denying the latter. Isberg v. Butler, 
U. S. Daily, Nov. 23, 1931, at 2160. Thus, unless some discretion is given the 
referee or court to deny the filing of a second assignment within a specified time 
of a previous assignment, there is nothing to prevent a whole series of repeated 
adjustments. 
47a50 F.(2d) 1035 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931). 
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adjustment plan. Under the present state of the law, the debtor can 
only secure his discharge in a friendly adjustment procedure if he is in 
a sufficiently strong bargaining position to insist upon releases from his 
creditors. In the Newark friendly adjustment cases, releases were al- 
most never considered. 
Of course in the matter of assignments for the benefit of creditors, 
state statutes may both grant powers and impose duties similar to those 
which are here suggested for incorporation in the Bankruptcy Act.48 But 
the provisions of state assignment acts vary so greatly and their appli- 
cability in a particular case rendered so doubtful by decisions holding 
that they are, at least in part, supplanted by the Federal Bankruptcy 
Act,49 that a uniform law for the country at large seems desirable. 
It would also seem that sections 12 and 13, governing composition, 
should be broadened so as to permit courts or referees to confirm exten- 
sion agreements approved by at least a majority of creditors in number 
8 For example, the New Jersey statute regulating assignments [1 N. J. COMP. 
STAT. (1910) 113] provides that assignments must be for the equal benefit of all 
creditors and that they must be recorded and filed to be valid. The assignee is 
required to follow a definite mode of making public the assignment so as to 
give creditors a chance to file their claims; the debtor and assignee must file an 
inventory of assets under oath and give a bond for the faithful performance 
of the trust. Lists of creditors must be filed with the surrogate. The assignee 
is empowered to oppose and contest any creditor's claim in the orphans' court. 
Final and intermediate accountings by the assignee under oath are required. The 
assignee, with certain exceptions, takes full legal title to the debtor's estate, and 
may seek the advice of the court and avoid preferences made or suffered to be 
made within two months of the assignment. He likewise is granted all powers, 
which creditors would have, to avoid transfers, conveyances, mortgages, etc. 
The compensation of the assignee-trustee is regulated as are fees in the proceed- 
ings. The assignor is not protected against creditors not exhibiting their claims, 
but is discharged as to those creditors who do (as to the validity of this provi- 
sion see note 49, infra). Only those creditors exhibiting their claims within three 
months of the assignment may share in the dividends. 
For other examples of state assignment statutes, see synopses of state laws 
in BURRILL, ASSIGNMENTS (6th ed. 1894) 609-694; and HAWES, VOLUNTARY AS- 
SIGNMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS (1876) (N. Y. Laws). And cf. J. W. 
SMITH, THE EQUITABLE REMEDIES OF CREDITORS (1899). In the absence of statute 
an assignee for the benefit of creditors is subject to no judicial supervision beyond 
that which may be imposed upon trustees generally. The common law assignee 
for the benefit of creditors "could administer such property as passed to him 
by deed, but nothing else" and "if the debtor had previously transferred prop- 
erty in fraud of the very creditors for, whose benefit the assignment of the re- 
maining property was made, the assignee had no standing to sue for the re- 
covery." GLENN, CREDITORS RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1915) ? 292. " See Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379, 2 Sup. Ct. 765 (1883), in which the 
Supreme Court held that the discharge provision of the New Jersey Assignment 
Statute, cited note 48, supra, was superseded by the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and thus unconstitutional, but refused to pass upon the question of whether 
the Bankruptcy Act superseded the state statute for all purposes. Cf. amend- 
ment to New Jersey act passed in 1928 providing that if "for any reason any 
section or any part of any section . . . shall be questioned in any court . . . 
the same shall not affect any other . . . provision of this act." N. J. COMP. 
STAT. (Supp. 1925-1930) 54, ? 12-31. On the question of how far the Bank- 
ruptcy Act has supplanted state laws dealing with insolvent debtors, consult 
also International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261, 49 Sup. Ct. 108 (1928). 
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and amount and thus again obviate the necessity of securing practically 
unanimous consent of all the creditors.50 Such a change would permit 
the business-like reorganization of many enterprises through the medium 
of creditors' committees. Apparently the nuisance value and legal posi- 
tion of a few dissenting claims are some of the main stumbling blocks 
to efficient management by creditors' committees at the present time.51 
Revision of the Bankruptcy Act along the lines suggested would re- 
sult in capitalizing on the devices successfully employed by business men 
to solve their difficulties by extending to those devices a legal sanction 
hitherto lacking. As a result it would obviate many of the present com- 
petitive features of bankruptcy. Further, it would remove from the 
system its predominant insistence on treating and administering all cases 
alike, without consideration of their basic differences. The total result 
should be the evolution of a system characterized by a business tech- 
nique designed in the light of the actualities of business problems. 
AMORTIZATION 
The problem of wage earner bankruptcies is susceptible of similar 
treatment. If a wage earner desires to pay his obligations why should not 
provision be made to that end? Due to wage assignments or garnish- 
ments or high pressure methods of collection, the wage earner who has 
indulged-or even overindulged-in consumer credit frequently is so 
harassed by his creditors that bankruptcy is the only way out. The col- 
lection agency camps on his doorstep. He is threatened with dire con- 
sequences if he fails to pay. At the time of the purchase of goods on 
installment or of the loan from a finance company he has signed a con- 
tract which assigns his wages to the particular creditor. Or he may have 
made similar assignments to several creditors. On default of one pay- 
ment the creditor threatens to file the assignment or to garnish his wages. 
If that happens, the debtor fears he will lose his job, as his employer 
does not want to act as bookkeeper for a finance company. The guaran- 
tors or co-makers of his note to a finance company may also have as- 
signed their wages as security. They are threatened by the creditor. 
Accordingly they put pressure on the debtor, as they also fear that their 
jobs are in danger. Again, the debtor on purchasing or borrowing may 
have signed as part of the elaborate contract an affidavit that at the time 
of incurring the particular indebtedness he owes no one else a cent. 
These are convenient weapons in the hands of creditors. They may be 
used to turn the screws a little tighter by a threat of prosecution. 
How far such collection methods prevail throughout the country 
50 As to the need of providing that a discharge by a confirmed composition 
bars a subsequent discharge by composition within a specified period, see note 
47, supra. 
5 Consult DEWING, op. cit. supra note 39, at 1151. 
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it is impossible to say. It is known, however, that they are present in 
many urban centers.52 These conditions are accentuated by the preva- 
lency of state statutes permitting wage assignments. Sometimes these 
are restricted; at other times they are not effectively controlled. Thus, 
in Illinois, the wage assignment as security for a loan is valid to the 
amount of 50% of the wages and as security for the purchase of goods 
to 100% of the wages.53 Furthermore, under the law of Illinois and 
Massachusetts, a wage assignment made before bankruptcy is not af- 
fected by a discharge, the court analogizing the security to a mortgage or 
other lien not disturbed by bankruptcy proceedings.54 
52 The situation appears particularly acute in urban centers in Kentucky. For 
the Kentucky statute on wage assignments, see KY. STAT. (Carroll, 1930), ? 4758a. 
The authors are indebted to Mr. Rolf Nugent of the Department of Remedial 
Loans of the Russell Sage Foundation for the following information concerning 
270 wage earner bankruptcies (selected at random) in the five principal cities 
of Kentucky (Ashland, Covington, Lexington, Louisville, Paducah) for the year 
1929: 
Seventy-four and two tenths per cent listed loan companies as creditors. The 
average number of loan accounts for each borrowing bankrupt was 4.53. The 
average size of loan listed was $39.10. The average indebtedness to loan com- 
panies was $177. The approximate monthly cost per borrower was $25. 
In Louisville, wage earner bankruptcies were approximately 94% of all 
bankruptcies for the year 1929. The study of these cases indicates how close 
is the relationship between bankruptcy and conditions in the small loan field and 
how bankruptcy may be acting as a corrective to pathological conditions arising 
out of lack of control over those financing the consumer. On consumer credit 
see CLARK, FINA'NCING THE CONSUMER (1930); BERGENGREN, CREDIT UNION 
(1931). 
53 The Illinois Loan Shark Law, ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 74, 
? 16, provides that "no assignment of any salary or any wages, earned or to be 
earned, given to secure any loan shall be valid, unless in writing" and that "under 
such assignment or order for the payment of future salary or wages given as 
security for a loan under this act, a sum of fifty (50) per centum of the bor- 
rower's salary or wages shall be collectible [collectable] by the licensee from the 
time that a copy thereof, verified by the oath of the licensee, of his agent, to- 
gether with a verified statement of the amount unpaid upon such loan, has been 
served upon the employer." It has been held that this section may not be evaded 
by two assignments of 50% each. Snite v. Chicago & E. I. R. R., 247 Ill. App. 
118 (1927). 
2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 154, governing wage assignments, provides that 
assignment embraces any instrument purporting to transfer or collect an interest 
in future wages. No such assignment to secure a loan of less than $300 shall 
be valid as against an employee unless (a) written acceptance is given and assign- 
ment recorded, acceptance for recordation to be allowed only if the assignment 
exempts $10 per week of salary; (b) unless a prescribed form is substantially 
followed; (c) unless the written consent of the wife is given in the case of 
married men; (d) and in no case shall the assignment be valid for more than 
one year from making thereof. Wage assignment to secure other than loans of 
less than $300 may not be enforced beyond two years. Such assignment must 
state interest rates, money value of goods actually furnished and that three 
fourths of wages are exempt. The wife's consent must be secured in writing. 
For a review of the legal and economic phases of wage assignments see the 
forthcoming report by the Russell Sage Foundation, Department of Remedial 
Loans, 130 E. 22nd St., New York City. The provisions of the statutes govern- 
ing wage assignments vary in different states. 
" Mallin v. Wenham, 209 Ill. 252, 70 N. E. 564 (1904) holds that an assign- 
ment of wages to be earned from a specific employment was valid despite the in- 
definite time for which employment was to run and that such an assignment 
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Garnishment or supplementary proceedings, though less effective 
as pressure devices, are sometimes employed to the same end.55 Thus 
in 221 bankruptcies of salaried individuals studied in Boston in the nine 
months ended June, 1931,56 supplementary proceedings were the direct 
might be discharged only by payment of the debt or discontinuance of the employ- 
ment. Held further that such assignment was still a valid claim against the as- 
signor after his discharge in bankruptcy. Accord: Monarch Discount Co. v. C. & 
O. Ry., 285 Ill. 233, 120 N. E. 743 (1918); Citizens' Loan Ass'n v. Boston & Maine 
R. R., 196 Mass. 528, 82 N. E. 696 (1907) (leading Mass. case). Contra: Leitch 
v. Northern Pacific Ry., 95 Minn. 35, 103 N. W. 704 (1905); In re West, 128 
Fed. 205 (D. Ore. 1904). Cf. Draeger v. Wisconsin Steel Co., 194 Ill. App. 
440 (1915) (assignment of wages prior to time wage earner secures employment 
is void and discharge in bankruptcy is good defense to an action for such wages). 
To the effect that an assignment of all future wages to be earned under an 
existing employment (italics the court's) may be assigned as security for a mer- 
chandise claim and that an agreement between employer and employee that 
such assignment shall not be made, will not avail the employer when sued by 
the assignor, see State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour & Co., 177 N. E. 702 
(Ill. 1931), noted in (1931) 86 N. Y. L. J. 1120. Cf. Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 
352, 88 N. E. 152 (1909). 
The enforceability of a wage assignment after a discharge in bankruptcy 
of the assignor appears to be governed by the state law defining the nature of 
the interest assigned. If such assignment creates a valid lien under the state 
law, that lien is one preserved under ? 67d of the Bankruptcy Act. Citizens' 
Loan Ass'n v. Boston & Maine R. R., supra; 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 
(3d ed. 1924) ? 3454. But cf. In re Fellows, 43 F.(2d) 122 (N. D. Okla. 1930) 
(intimating discharge bars subsequent suit irrespective of state law). Where 
no lien arises on future wages iby state law, it is clear that a discharge in bank- 
ruptcy is a good defense to a suit to collect wages due. In re Voorhees, 41 F. 
(2d) 81 (N. D. Ohio 1930). 
55 Garnishment statutes vary in different states. ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 
1931) c. 62, ? 14: "The wages or salary for services of an employee who is the 
head of a family and residing with the same to the amount of twenty dollars 
per week, shall be exempt from garnishment. All above said exempt amount 
shall be liable to garnishment." If the employee does not fall within the provi- 
sions of this section, his wages may be garnished after the manner set forth in 
c. 62, ? 5. 
Under the Poor Debtor Law of Massachusetts [MASS. CUM. STAT. (1927) 
c. 224], which went into effect March 1, 1928, a judgment creditor may file appli- 
cation for supplementary process. In that event a summons may issue requir- 
ing the debtor to appear and be examined relative to his property and ability to 
pay. The failure of a debtor to appear without reasonable excuse or to submit 
to an examination shall constitute contempt of court. The court may issue war- 
rants for arrest to secure the attendance. The court may order the debtor to 
produce non-exempt property or if the debtor be able to pay the judgment in 
full or by partial payments the court may, after allowing the debtor out of his 
income a reasonable amount for support of himself and family, order him to 
make full or partial payments from time to time. Further the court may at any 
time renew, revise, modify, suspend or revoke any such order. With minor ex- 
ceptions there is no appeal. See ?? 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19. This is the law which 
was the direct cause for the filing of the petition in the wage earner cases dis- 
cussed infra. 
5This study was made by the Yale Law School and Institute of Human 
Relations of Yale University with the cooperation of the Department of Com- 
merce. It was made possible only because of genuine and whole-hearted co- 
operation on the part of the three distinguished Boston referees, Hon. Arthur 
Black, Hon. B. Loring Young, and Hon. Charles C. Cabot. The Department 
of Commerce was represented by Mr. Victor Sadd. The Boston cases studied 
included 910 cases of all types and classes of bankrupts. Only cases arising in 
the metropolitan area of Boston (i.e., the counties of Suffolk, Norfolk, and Mid- 
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cause of the filing of the petition in practically every case. 
The cumulative effect of these various devices employed by credi- 
tors frequently is to put the wage earner under a constant, overwhelm- 
ing and imponderable burden of fear. He may have been improvident. 
He may have overindulged in easy credit, made easier by subtle methods 
of advertisement. He may have been optimistic. Or again illness, par- 
tial unemployment, reduction of salary and medical costs may have 
intervened and made the payment of the promised installments abso- 
lutely impossible if he and his family are to be provided with the necessi- 
ties of life. Yet in spite of his improvidence, ignorance, or misfortune 
he may be honest and sincerely desirous of avoiding the stigma of bank- 
ruptcy. All that he may need is the opportunity to declare a moratorium 
and amortize his obligations in the light of his ability to pay. Under 
the present system one rapacious creditor may by insistent and unrea- 
sonable demands jeopardize the interests of all other creditors by im- 
poverishing the debtor until bankruptcy is the only feasible solution; or 
the activities of one creditor may spur on other creditors, each demand- 
ing his pound of flesh, each insisting on the letter of the contract. If 
the debtor goes into bankruptcy the chances are that his creditors will 
get nothing since his ability to pay is measured only in terms of future 
earnings. 
In this connection, the 221 bankruptcies of salaried persons stud- 
ied in Boston are significant. As previously noted, in practically every 
case the direct cause of the filing of the petition was supplementary pro- 
ceedings. In 75% of the cases there were no assets. The average amount 
of assets was $219; the average amount of liabilities $3524. In 82 cases 
(13%) debts were owed to loan and finance companies (not including 
commercial banks), the average of such debts being $626. Likewise, 
in 82 cases an average of $420 each was owed for goods bought on 
installment. There were 54 different loan and finance companies with 
claims and 20 credit unions. Eighteen of these loan and finance com- 
panies were unlicensed and operating outside the law by charging in 
excess of the legal 42% a year interest. Twenty-five of the 221 bank- 
rupts owed these 18 unlicensed companies. 
Among the 221 cases there were not more than half a dozen whose 
bankruptcies bordered on fraud. In not over 7% of the cases could it 
be said that there was gross and unjustifiable extravagance on the part 
of the bankrupt measured as of the time of the incurrence of the in- 
dlesex) were covered. About 70% of all those cases in which petitions were 
filed between October 1, 1930, and June 30, 1931. were taken. For a report on 
the methods of investigation, see Douglas and Thomas, The Business Failures 
Project-II. An Analysis of Methods of Investigation (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 
1034. For a partial report on the results of the study see Douglas, supra note 3. 
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debtedness. In the balance of the cases the debtors were apparently 
honest persons engulfed by an overwhelming volume of debts (in- 
curred in more prosperous or normal times) when on the downward 
turn of the business cycle they lost their jobs or suffered reductions 
of income; or when illness intervened or the cost of medical care be- 
came abnormal. Many other factors were mirrored in these bankrupt- 
cies, such as domestic difficulties and accommodation indorsements. 
But the fact remains that in the vast majority they were cases of varying 
degrees of misfortune precipitated by the increasing demands on and 
availability of consumptive credit. 
It is understandable that bankruptcy was the only way out for 
most of these persons. The incessant pressure of creditors, the toll of 
the poor debtors' court and the fear of losing their jobs were controlling 
factors. During the year preceding bankruptcy, 5% had received no salary 
or income whatsoever; 5% had received less than $500; 16% between 
$500 and $999; 23% between $1000 and $1499; 24% between $1500 
and $1999; 19% between $2000 and $2499; and 8% over $2500. The 
average salary was $1526. Only 54% had been employed full time; 
33% for half time or more (but less than full time); 8% worked, 
but for less than half time; 5% were completely unemployed. Yet 
these facts do not mean that with adequate provision for their protec- 
tion many of these bankrupts would not have undertaken to amortize 
all or part of their indebtedness. It is believed that their inherent hon- 
esty and their desire to avoid if possible the stigma of bankruptcy would 
have induced many of them to pursue that course rather than bank- 
ruptcy. 
Amortization of such debts is not wholly theoretical and untried.. 
It has been successfully demonstrated on a small scale by the National' 
Funding Company in Seattle, Washington, since 1925, and on a larger 
scale by the American Amortization Company in Chicago, Illinois,. 
since the early part of 1929. The experiences of the latter company 
are of great significance.57 It administers between 800 and 900 wage- 
earner cases a year. The monthly wages of the debtors in these cases. 
range from $90 to $300. The average wage is $125 per month. The 
clientele includes men from all walks of life and all classes of occupa- 
tion-junior executives of corporations, clerks, street car and railroad 
employees, electricians, mechanics, engineers, truck drivers, artisans,. 
etc. The average indebtedness is approximately $930; the range is from 
a few hundred dollars to over $5000. Approximately 8.3% of the aver- 
57 The authors are grateful to Mr. Henry A. Coit, President of the American 
Amortization Co., 30 No. LaSalle St., Chicago, Ill., for most of the information 
on the operation and experience of that company. No publications are available 
respecting the company except those prepared by it for private circulation. 
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age debtor's income goes for interest to loan companies; in other words, 
about one month's income out of the year. The average debtor owes 
three loan companies a total amount of $550. Practically all such loans 
are secured by wage assignments and chattel mortgages on household 
goods. 
Cases are obtained for the most part directly from the wage 
earners or through other wage earners who have been clients and who 
recommend it to their friends. Occasionally employers suggest it, in- 
frequently creditors. One of the officers of the company analyzes the 
wage earner's financial condition and decides what maximum monthly, 
bi-weekly, or weekly payments can be made to the creditors. The debtor 
contracts with the company to pay such installments to it and author- 
izes it to disburse the payments to the creditors. The arrangement is 
purely voluntary on the part of the debtor. Creditors are not parties to 
it and hence as respects them it has no legal sanction. They can still 
proceed to garnish or to file assignments of wages. They can still con- 
tinue their persistent demands on the debtor. Without legal sanction 
the debtor cannot be relieved of all the pressure. But the fact is that 
between him and the creditors is inserted a third party who knows the 
system of the collection agency, who can talk its language and call its 
bluff and who is not susceptible of the same degree and kind of pres- 
sure as is the wage earner. As a result, the overreaching on the part of 
rapacious creditors is minimized and their threats can be treated on the 
merits. Consequently, for the most part the debtor is enabled to pro- 
'ceed in a methodical and business-like way to fund his obligations 
through the agency of this intermediary. 
The average time taken for amortization is 22 months. In but 
very few of the cases has the debtor made each payment under the am- 
,ortization plan punctually. Most of the cases require some revision and 
.adjustment before completion. These defaults are almost always due to 
some justifiable and understandable cause. It may be that a member of 
the family was injured or ill and the money was needed for those ex- 
penses. Wages may have been reduced or employment curtailed. The 
fact remains that during the three years of its existence the company has 
been able completely to amortize the indebtedness of the wage earners 
in the vast majority of the cases which it has taken over. With minor 
exceptions, failure to amortize was due to the insistence of creditors 
that they be paid according to the letter of the contract. 
The company is not an eleemosynary institution. It is in the 
business for profit. Its charges average about 42 %o of the total in- 
debtedness. This is paid not by the creditors but by the debtor. For 
that charge he is able to avoid bankruptcy, keep his job, and obtain re- 
lief from much of his anxiety and fear. 
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How representative the conditions in Illinois are is not known. 
Certainly the cases studied in Boston do not approach those cases in 
the severity of the problem of the loan company. Yet from what has 
been said previously it is clear that other urban centers present as ex- 
treme conditions as Illinois.58 The severity of the practices of loan com- 
panies, however, is not the determining factor in providing for amorti- 
zation. That is bottomed on the pressure of the creditors and the in- 
herent honesty and respectability of the debtors. 
It would seem desirable to provide in the Bankruptcy Act for such 
procedure. The wage earner should be able to advise the court or other 
official in charge that he desires to amortize. The creditors and the 
bankrupt should be permitted a hearing to determine what funding 
would be feasible and practicable. In the light of the facts of the par- 
ticular case the bankruptcy official in charge should be able to declare 
a moratorium, restrain creditors from their attempts at collection and 
undertake a payment of the debts over a term. Or an amortization 
plan should be allowed to be submitted on behalf of the debtor by such 
a company as the American Amortization Company, duly qualified and 
bonded by the court to act in such capacity, and a hearing be given on 
the plan submitted. On the basis of the plan as approved, amortization 
should be allowed, reserving to the court residuary jurisdiction to con- 
trol the administration for the interests of all parties and to supervise 
the fees charged. 
If the experience of the American Amortization Company proves 
to be representative, defaults would be made by the debtors under these 
amortization plans. In the event of such default the creditors, debtor 
and amortization agency should be entitled to a hearing. If it should 
appear that the default is not justified under all the circumstances of 
the case, the court or official in charge should be able to adjudge the 
debtor a bankrupt and thereupon proceed to administer the estate in 
the normal way. If, as previously suggested, there is power to refuse, 
suspend or grant, conditionally or unconditionally, a discharge, the case 
can be disposed of in light of its peculiarities. Such threat of refusal, 
suspension or conditional grant of the discharge should serve effec- 
tively as a deterrent to prevent unjustifiable defaults under amortiza- 
tion plans. On the other hand, a default might well be justified due to 
the subsequent intervention of sickness, unemployment, etc. In such 
case the court or other official should have the power after such hear- 
ing to revise the plan and reinstate the program on a new basis. Ob- 
viously such default should not be grounds for suspending, denying or 
conditionally granting the discharge. 
58 See note 52, supra. 
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A few other aspects of such a proposal should be noted. In the 
first place, amortization should not be mandatory on the part of the 
debtor. There is no apparent reason why the debtor should be dis- 
criminated against just because he is a wage earner. Under the pro- 
visions suggested above concerning assignments, extensions and com- 
positions, the business man has the option to go through bankruptcy 
or to cooperate with his creditors in making satisfactory and equitable 
settlements or adjustments. His honesty and desire for respectability 
may lead him to choose the latter course. To permit him to have such 
an option and to deprive the wage earner of it would be to enact a 
species of unwarranted class legislation. Further, the wage earner may 
be in such straightened circumstances as to make any attempt impos- 
sible. As noted above, of the 221 Boston salaried bankrupts, 5% re- 
ceived no salary during the year preceding bankruptcy, and 21% less 
than $1000. Hence refusal to amortize should not under any circum- 
stances be a ground for refusing, suspending or conditionally granting 
a discharge. 
In the second place, the debtor should be allowed to amortize even 
though he has not obtained the consent of a certain percentage of his 
creditors. The retailer, manufacturer, etc., is in a better position to 
bargain and negotiate with his creditors than the wage earner. The 
latter is dominated by them and incapable of such negotiations. While 
an amortization company would be in a better position in that regard, 
the fact remains that there are so few of them at present as to make 
their presence negligible in the totality of the national bankruptcy sys- 
tem. The chances are that creditors would desire to get something 
rather than nothing and agree to such a plan. The court or other official 
then should have the power to inaugurate it. The point has another 
significance. If such consent was not made a condition to amortiza- 
tion, funding programs outside of court would be encouraged. Any 
agency which had obtained the debtor's consent to amortize could deal 
effectively (but fairly) with rapacious creditors by a counter-threat to 
file the plan in court. Thus additional encouragement would be given 
to voluntary settlements. 
In the third place, the debtor should not be forced by the court or 
other official to amortize all his debts or none. It may be that the burden 
would be so great as to make an attempt impracticable. Here again 
there is no apparent justification for class legislation. Under the provi- 
sions suggested above for businesses, a settlement might be approved 
netting less than 100 cents on the dollar. Such adjustments would be 
made in light of available assets and prospective earnings of the busi- 
ness. Like adjustments should be made possible in wage earner cases 
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on the basis of future earning capacity. To restrict the alternatives to 
amortization of all debts or bankruptcy would make it impossible for 
the honest debtor to meet his creditors half way. That is made clear by 
the 221 salaried bankrupts studied in Boston. As noted previously, their 
average salary for the year preceding bankruptcy was only $1526; 5% 
received no salary; 21% less than $1000; 46% less than $1500. In 
this connection provision for amortization should be sufficiently flex- 
ible to permit cancellation of all or part of the interest during the 
amortization period. Where the interest amounts to sizable sums as it 
apparently does in Chicago and Louisville,59 the burden of carrying 
those charges through amortization might well be so great as to defeat 
the funding plan. 
Finally, there is the need of defining the term "wage earner." Under 
the present act it is defined as one whose yearly salary does not exceed 
$1500.60 On the basis of the experience of the American Amortiza- 
tion Company that description embraces the average case. But it ex- 
cludes many others whose salaries exceed that amount but whose situ- 
ation in many respects is on all fours with that of their lower paid breth- 
ren. For example, in the 221 Boston cases referred to, it would exclude 
51% of the cases. Amorlg the 221 Boston cases there is very little, if any, 
distinction between the cases where the income was below $1500 and the 
cases where it exceeded that amount. As respects them, the distinction 
drawn in the bankruptcy act is wholly arbitrary. A less arbitrary dis- 
tinction would be between the salaried class and entrepreneurs. Some 
upper limit might be set. But conceivably the amortization procedure 
might be as effective and desirable in the case of the $10,000 a year 
executive as in the case of the $1000 a year clerk. 
SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION 
Even if the foregoing suggestions concerning amortizations, ex- 
tensions and assignments should be incorporated into the Bankruptcy 
Act, still a great number of small debtors will probably continue to ap- 
pear before the bankruptcy courts. For such small asset cases some form 
of summary administration in which speed and economy are the dom- 
inant features is necessary. 
The cases with small assets or no assets have been discussed early 
in this article. It will be recalled that for the nation as a whole, 82% of 
all cases closed during the fiscal year ended June 30, 1930, had either 
no assets or assets below $500; and that 65% had no assets whatso- 
ever, over and above exemptions. In these cases the administration 
59 Supra 50; note 52, supra. 60 ?1 (27). 
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expenses averaged 85% for cases with assets from $1-$100; and 63% 
for cases with assets from $251-$500. The data for the New Jersey 
cases was quite comparable. It has also been noted above how inactive 
and lethargic the creditors became in such cases. Furthermore, among 
the New Jersey bankrupts studied, it required, on the average, twelve 
months to wind up those cases in which assets totaled less than $500. 
By way of comparison the average time required to liquidate all those 
cases above $5000 was only about 17 months. Possibly time is not of 
the essence in liquidating the large estates, but it certainly seems 
that the system of bankruptcy administration should be made suf- 
ficiently flexible to permit more rapid handling of the small bankruptcy. 
In this connection, a new section should be added to the Bankruptcy 
Act modeled after that section of the English act61 which provides that 
summary administration may be had in "small bankruptcies," defined 
as those in which the assets are not "likely to exceed in value f300."62 
The new section suggested should empower the referee or court to 
extend a summary procedure to cases where realized assets will prob- 
ably not exceed, say, $500. Following such determination, unless there 
is objection from a certain number of creditors, there should be in- 
stituted a scheme of summary administration whereby most of the many 
notices to creditors and their subsequent waiting periods would be 
dispensed with and the six months period for filing proofs of claim 
cut down to one or two months. 
In other words there seems to be no forceful reason for applying 
to such cases the elaborate and detailed procedure designed for and 
necessary in cases of the larger estates. But in such administrative de- 
tails and in them only should distinction be made between the small and 
large cases. The same rigorous and systematic examination and the 
same methods in dispensing discharges should be employed in all cases. 
Thoroughness should not be sacrificed for expedition; vigilance for 
speed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In light of the above data and observations, the following revi- 
sions of the Bankruptcy Act are suggested: 
1. In all cases where there are no assets (above exemptions) or 
614 & 5 GEO. V, ? 129 (1914). And see Bankruptcy Rule 298 (1915-1928), 
which provides that in small bankruptcies, advertisement of proceedings is to be 
dispensed with, no questions of law and fact may be referred to a jury, the time 
and place and number of creditors' meetings may be limited, notices of meetings 
need be sent only to creditors whose claims exceed ?2, and the estate shall be 
liquidated with all reasonable dispatch and where practicable, distributed in a 
single dividend. 
62See Donovan, supra note 4, at 176, for a description of the procedure under that act. 
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assets below, say, $5000, the trustee should be appointed by the court 
or referee; only in other cases should creditors have the power to elect 
a trustee. 
2. Compulsory and thorough examination of every bankrupt, the 
examination to be preceded by submission on the part of the debtor 
of a verified statement showing not only his assets and liabilities but 
also the antecedents of his failure. 
3. Compulsory and systematic hearing on every application for a 
discharge. 
4. Discretion on the part of the court, or other official empowered 
to dispense discharges, to refuse, suspend, or grant them, conditionally 
or unconditionally, in the light of the facts and complexions of the 
cases. 
5. Eliminating a general assignment for the benefit of creditors 
as an act of bankruptcy in specified cases where the assignment is filed 
and accepted; providing machinery for filing specified assignments, ex- 
tensions and compositions with the court, and, on acceptance thereof 
by the court, extending to such arrangements immunity from attack 
by minorities, and supervision by the court of their administration; 
and endowing the assignee-trustee thereunder with the powers of a 
trustee in bankruptcy. 
6. Providing for amortization of debts by salaried bankrupts at 
their option, sufficient flexibility being provided to allow for partial 
amortization and readjustments of funding programs and no penalty 
being imposed for mere failure or refusal to amortize in full or in part. 
7. Segregation of no asset cases and cases with assets below, say, 
$500, for summary administration. 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 
J. HOWARD MARSHALL 
YALE LAW SCHOOL 
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